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Abstract The issue of power plays a relevant role in evaluating the representativeness of a
Parliament. In this paper a new governability index is introduced, taking inspiration from the
propensity to disruption and referring to the power of the parties.
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1. Introduction
An electoral system, or voting system, may be viewed as a mechanism for transform-
ing the preferences of a population into a Parliament. It corresponds to the set of rules
governing the various steps of the election, from how the voters express their prefe-
rences on the parties till how the seats are assigned to the parties. It is natural to pose
the question of which system is preferable, but the complexity of the problem and the
number of different parameters that may inﬂuence the decision may make very hard to
give an answer that is suitable for all the possible real-world situations.
Let us consider the following classical example.
Example 1. Three parties A, B, C have the following distribution of votes:
A B C
49% 49% 2%








When K is not a multiple of 100, it is necessary to round the result. Supposing that
the Parliament is made up by 6 seats the ratios in the previous table are 2.94, 2.94, 0.12,
respectively, so the following assignments, each corresponding to a different voting
system, seem reasonable for representing voters’ preferences (Table 1).
∗ University of Eastern Piedmont, Department of Sciences and Advanced Technologies, Via V. Bellini 25/G,
15100 Alessandria, Italy. Phone: +390131360224, E-mail: vito.fragnelli@mfn.unipmn.it.
AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 3, no. 3 243V. Fragnelli
Table 1. Seats assignments
A B C
h1 3 3 0
h2 3 2 1
h3 2 3 1
Note that in all the three systems, h1, h2 and h3, at least one pair of parties does
not generate a majority, while according to the votes distribution all pairs represent a
possible majority.
This simple example shows that it is difﬁcult to take into account all the elements
that may inﬂuence the quality of an electoral system. In this paper we deal with the
role of power, in order to improve the correct evaluation of a voting system. In other
words, we want to evaluate an electoral system more on the basis of the power assigned
to the parties than of the number of seats they receive. The concept of power may be
deﬁned and measured in different ways. Here, we refer mainly to the inﬂuence of a
party in forming a majority, e.g. the consequence of its behavior in favor or against the
approval of a law, and measure it using game theoretical indices of power.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In the next section we recall some basic
deﬁnitions of game theory; Section 3 presents two of the most largely accepted param-
eters for evaluating a Parliament, namely the representativeness and the governability;
Section 4 is devoted to the introduction of two new indices based on the power assigned
to the parties; ﬁnally, some remarks conclude.
2. Some recalls of game theory
A cooperative game with transferable utility or TU-game, is a pair (N,v), where
N = {1,2,...,n} denotes the ﬁnite set of players and v : 2N → R is the characteris-
tic function, with v(/ 0) = 0. v(S) is the worth of coalition S ⊆ N, i.e. what players in S
may obtain standing alone.
A game is simple when v : 2N → {0,1}, monotonicity holds, i.e. S ⊆ T ⇒ v(S) ≤
v(T), and v(N) = 1. If v(S) = 0 then S is a losing coalition, while if v(S) = 1 then S is
a winning coalition.
Given a simple game, i ∈ N is a veto player if v(S) = 0, for each S ⊆ N \{i}, i.e.
all coalitions not including player i are losing.
A particular class of simple games are the weighted majority games. The play-
ers are associated to a weight vector w = (w1,w2,...,wn) that leads to the following




1 if åi∈Swi > q
0 otherwise ,
where q is the quota. Usually we ask that q ≥ 1/2åi∈N wi, so that if S is winning N\S
is losing.
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An allocation is a n-dimensional vector (xi)i∈N ∈ RN assigning to player i ∈ N the
amount xi; an allocation (xi)i∈N is efﬁcient if x(N) = åi∈N xi = v(N). A solution is
a function y that assigns an allocation y(v) to every TU-game belonging to a given
class of games G with player set N.
Two classical solutions for TU-games are the Shapley value (Shapley 1953) and
the Owen value (Owen 1977). The Shapley value assigns to each player his average






where p is a permutation of the players and P(p;i) is the set of players that precede






where n = |N| and s = |S|. (|S| denotes the cardinality, i.e. the number of elements, of
a set S.)
For a simple game the Shapley value is referred to as the Shapley-Shubik index
(Shapley and Shubik 1954).
The Owen value is a coalitional version of the Shapley value, i.e. the players are
supposed to be structured according to a priori unions, i.e. the player set N is parti-
tioned as K = {T1,...,Tk}, with Ti∩Tj = / 0,i 6= j and
S
i=1,...,kTi = N. The Owen value
can be written as:
Wi(K) = å
H ⊆ K
Tj / ∈ H
å
S ⊆ Tj




where h = |H|,k = |K| and tj = |Tj|.
3. How to evaluate a parliament?
According to the current literature, the choice of the “best” parliament may be affected
by a lot of facets of the political process, but two of them may be considered more
relevant than the others: representativeness that depends on the efﬁciency of the system
in representing electors’ preferences and governability that measures the effect on the
efﬁciency of the resulting government. The resulting government depends also on
the choices of the parties, but nevertheless we may ﬁx a rule for forming a majority
and we may apply this rule to all the possible parliaments associated to several voting
systems; we refer to Rusinowska et al. (2004) for an analysis of possible majority
formation rules. We address the reader to Fragnelli et al. (2005) for a list of possible
parameters for evaluating a parliament and related references. Representativeness and
governability can be measured by two indices, r and g respectively, normalized in the
interval [0,1], that can be deﬁned in several ways.
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As pointed out in Fragnelli et al. (2005), when we restrict the analysis to a single
election the comparison among several electoral systems using the two parameters r
and g, we may have the following situations:
(i) A system may have worse values for both indices w.r.t. another system, i.e. the
ﬁrst system is dominated, consequently it may be excluded.
(ii) A system may have better values for both indices w.r.t. all the other systems, i.e.
the ﬁrst system is dominant, consequently it is the best system.
(iii) A system may be neither dominated or dominant, i.e. if an index has a better
value the other index has a worse value w.r.t. another system, consequently all
these systems are Pareto optimal.
Of course, not always a dominant system exists, so that the choice among the Pareto
optimal systems requires other tools, that are beyond the aim of this paper, and for
which we refer to Fragnelli et al. (2005).
The measure of the representativeness of a voting system may be obtained on the
basis of the distribution of votes and of seats. In Fragnelli et al. (2005), the repre-
sentativeness is measured on the basis of the difference between the votes casted in a









where N is the set of parties, Sh
i is the number of seats of party i with system h, SPP
i is
the number of seats of party i with the perfect proportional system and Su
i is equal to
the total number of seats for the relative majority party under system h, i.e. applying
the option the winner takes all, and is equal to 0 otherwise.
Computing this index for the three systems h1, h2 and h3 in Example 1, we obtain
0.961, 0.693 and 0.693, respectively.













where mh is the number of parties of the governing coalition under system h that may
destroy the majority if they withdraw, fh is the number of seats of the majority under
system h and T is the total number of seats in the Parliament.
Supposing that the governing coalition corresponds to the minimal winning coali-
tion that includes the relative majority party, we may compute this index for the three
systems h1, h2 and h3 in Example 1, obtaining 0.500 for h1 and 0.444 for h2 and
h3 when the majority is formed by parties A and B or 0.389 if the majority includes
party C.
Now we introduce another system, h4, that assigns 2 seats to each party; for this
system the representativeness index is 0.386 (supposing that under system u all seats
go to party A or B) or 0.680 (supposing that under system u all seats go to party C) and
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the governability index is 0.389. So, we may conclude that the system h1 is “the best”
as it dominates the other three systems.
Computing the weighted majority games associated to the distribution of votes, v,
using the percentages as weights and to the distribution of seats according to the voting
systems h1, h2, h3 and h4, with the number of seats in the role of weights and using the
simple quota q = 1/2åi∈N wi, we obtain values in Table 2:
Table 2. Weighted majority games (see Example 1)
Voting system
Coalitions
A B C AB AC BC ABC
v 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
h1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
h2 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
h3 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
h4 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
It is easy to check that the games associated to systems h1, h2 and h3 have at least
one veto player, while the one associated to system h4 has no veto players, as the game
associated to v.
4. The role of power
In this section we switch our attention to the power of the parties and look for the
relationship among the power they have according to the distribution of votes and ac-
cording to the distribution of seat. We use as power measure of the parties the Shapley-
Shubik index of the weighted majority game associated to the distribution of votes and
to the distributions of seats.
We want to remark that other indices could be used but the aim of this paper is
methodological, i.e. it proposes to use the power of the parties in the evaluation of a
Parliament, more than technical, i.e. computing the “right value” of a Parliament. We
just mention as possible indices those by Banzhaf (1965), Deegan and Packel (1978),
and Holler (1982). The motivation behind the choice of the Shapley-Shubik index is
thatforthisindexthereexiststhecoalitionalversion, whichwillenableustoemphasize
the role of the majority coalition (see Subsection 4.2).
4.1 Power and representativeness
We proposes a representativeness index based on power starting from the idea of
measuring the distance of the distribution of power on the votes and on the seats,
i.e. åi∈N |fv
i −fh
i |. This distance is zero when the power of each party is identical
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Remark 1. The representativeness is maximal, i.e. equal to 1, when the power of each
party is identical in the two distributions. A particular case happens when the per-
centages of votes coincide with the percentages of seats, e.g. in the pure proportional
system, according to standard literature.
It is possible that the index assumes a negative value, as in the following example.
Example 2. Consider a relative majority system with two parties A and B and three
districts D1, D2 and D3, each one electing a single member. The results of the elections
and the assignment of the seats are in Table 3:
Table 3. A simple voting system
Parties D1 D2 D3 % of votes # of seats
A 16 6 8 60 1
B 2 8 10 40 2
Theweightedmajoritygameonvotes, wv, andonseats, wh, arewv(A)=1,wv(B)=
0,wv(AB) = 1 and wh(A) = 0,wh(B) = 1,wh(AB) = 1, respectively. In this case fv =
(1,0) and fh = (0,1), so the index is 1−2 = −1.
To avoid this situation we can normalize the index in the interval [0,1], simply
dividing åi∈N |fv
i −fh
i | by 2, as in the worst case the two distributions of power may






Example 3. Referring to Example 1 we have:
Table 4. The new representativeness index (see Example 1)






















































So, the system h4 that had the worst representativeness according to the previous
index obtains the maximal performance, with the same power distribution of the votes.
1 Two vectors are complementary when each non-zero component in a vector corresponds to a zero compo-
nent in the other vector.
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This is not the ﬁrst case in which power is used for evaluating representativeness.
Gambarelli and Biella (1992) propose to measure the distance of two distributions
referring to the percentages of distribution of voters, v, to the assignment of seats ac-
cording to an electoral system h, sh, and to the power of the parties related to the votes









Referring to the Shapley value as power index we get that D = 0.313 for h4 and D =
0.333 for the other systems. 1−D can be used as a representativeness index that gives
the value 0.687 for h4 and 0.667 for the other systems.
4.2 Power and governability
Our motivation for this subsection arises from the following question: Why not to use
power indices also for governability?
We were inspired by the propensity to disrupt (see Gately 1974), that measures
how much a proposed allocation x is satisfactory for player i. Suppose that the grand
coalitionN formsandtheplayersagreeonanallocationx=(x1,x2,...,xn); ifplayeri∈
N recedes from N, he receives v(i) instead of xi and the other players receive globally
v(N \{i}) instead of x(N \{i}). The larger is xi −v(i) the less is the propensity to
disrupt for player i and the larger is x(N \{i})−v(N \{i}) the less the other players










may be used as
indices of the stability of a parliamentary coalition S ⊆ N.
When S represents a majority coalition, it is possible to emphasize its power using
the Owen value, W, instead of the Shapley-Shubik index, that assigns null power to
each player not in the majority.
We propose to take into account the quantity
Wi(S)−Wi(S\{i}), i ∈ S,
where W(S) is the Owen value when the coalition structure KS considers the coalition S
and all the other players as singletons, i.e. KS = {S,{i1},...,{in−s}} and KS\{i} = {S\
{i},{i},{i1},...,{in−s}}, wheres=|S|. Ifweconsiderthedifferenceofpowerofparty
i when it is in a majority coalition S and when it leaves the majority Wi(S)−Wi(S\{i}),
we have a measure of the propensity of party i to leave the majority. Consequently, the
higher is the propensity of the parties to stay in the majority, the higher is the stability
of the majority.





= 1−åi∈SWi(S\{i}), where we used that if S is a majority
then åi∈SWi(S) = 1.
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Remark3. Accordingtothestandardliterature, thegovernabilityismaximal, i.e.equal
to 1, when S is such that each subcoalition S \{i} is winning, i.e. the majority is
not affected whichever party leaves it. Note that in this case for each party i ∈ S,
Wi(S\{i}) = 0.
Again, it is possible that the index assumes a negative value, as in Example 4.
Example 4. Consider a weighted majority game (N,w) in which the unique winning
coalition is the grand coalition. In this case Wi(N) = 1/n, i ∈ N; if party k leaves
the majority its power becomes Wk(N \{k}) = 1/2 and the power of the other n−1
parties becomes Wi(N \{k}) = 1/2(n−1). So, the index is 1−åi∈N Wi(N \{i}) =
1−åi∈N 1/2 that is negative when n ≥ 3.
To avoid this situation we can normalize the index in the interval [0,1], simply




Example 5. Referring to Example 1 we have the following values gW




h4 =0.778. Again, thesystemh4 thathadtheworstgovernability accord-
ing to the previous index obtains the best value and taking into account both indices rW
and gW the system h4 results to be dominant.
The following example taken from Fragnelli et. al (2005) is used for a comparison
of the indices based on power with the indices used in Fragnelli et. al (2005), referring
to a situation that is more realistic than the one considered in the previous examples. 2
Table 5. Seats assignment after simulation of different voting systems
Voting system2 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12
PP(= v) 18 22 5 4 0 5 0 1 0 17 28 0
P−4 19 22 5 4 0 5 0 0 0 17 28 0
P(20) 14 16 3 3 0 3 0 1 0 12 48 0
M 14 36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 0
2R 14 36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 0
C 14 36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 46 0
B 9 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 32 0
A 18 37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 27 0
I−25 15 33 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 45 0
I−75 17 25 4 3 0 4 0 1 0 13 33 0
- PP Pure proportionality M Relative majority B Borda count
P−n Threshold proportionality 2R Two-round runoff A Approval voting
P(n) Prized proportionality C Condorcet method I−n Mixed-member
2 For a description of the voting systems we refer to Fragnelli and Ortona (2006).
250 AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 3, no. 3The Propensity to Disruption for Evaluating a Parliament
Example 6. Consider an electoral situation that involves 12 parties P1,P2,...,P12, or-
dered on a left-right axis. Using the simulation program ALEX, developed at De-
partment POLIS of University of Eastern Piedmont (see Bissey et al. 2004), we may
compare the resulting Parliament according to ten different voting systems, obtaining
Table 5, where the bold numbers identify the parties forming the majority in each sys-
tem, corresponding to the minimal winning coalition including the relative majority
party and the closest parties according to the left-right ordering.
We supposed a unique 100-seat constituency for the pure proportional and thres-
hold proportional systems, a unique (100−n)-seat constituency for the prized propor-
tional system, a n-seat plus 100−n one-seat constituencies for the mixed-member sys-
tem and 100 one-seat constituencies for all the other systems. Computing the indices
we obtain values in Table 6:
Table 6. Comparison of old and new representativeness and governability indices, referring to
the distribution of seats in Table 5
Voting system r g rW gW
PP 1.000 0.201 1.000 0.944
P−4 0.986 0.204 0.958 0.932
P(20) 0.722 0.367 0.621 0.937
M 0.500 0.453 0.676 0.931
2R 0.500 0.453 0.676 0.931
C 0.556 0.257 0.801 0.931
B 0.667 0.343 0.651 0.944
A 0.795 0.350 0.651 0.944
I−25 0.611 0.201 0.879 0.936
I−75 0.889 0.201 0.915 0.944
We may refer to a graphical representation for the two pairs of indices (using dif-











































Figure 1. Comparison of the electoral systems in Table 5 using old and new representativeness
and governability indices
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In this case the indices r and g produce six Pareto optimal systems, namely M, 2R,
P(20), A, P−4 and PP while the indices rW and gW identify PP as a dominant system.
5. Concluding remarks and further research
In this paper we introduced two new indices for representativeness and governability,
both inspired by the idea of taking into account the issue of power distribution on the
parties of a Parliament. The main feature of this approach is that the relevance of a
party is related not directly to the number of seats assigned to it by the voting system,
but to the power originating by the distribution of seats. Referring again to the ex-
ample in the Introduction, we want to stress that the system h4 is apparently the less
representative but on the other hand is the one that better ﬁgures out the effectiveness
of parties in forming a majority. Referring to the governability index gW, it is possible
to follow different hypotheses on the behavior of the parties. For instance, we may
suppose a different coalition structure in which there are just two a priori unions, one
including the parties in the majority and the other one the remaining parties; after that
a party leaves the majority it joins to the other union. This leads to a different govern-
ability index gW∗
= 1−åi∈SWi(S\{i},(N\S)∪{i})/n. This index may be suitable
for bipolar situations in which two large parties attract the remaining small parties, that
have to decide which of the two large parties join with. Further indices may be deﬁned
according to other possible choices of the parties in forming coalitions.
Possible developments of the ideas in this paper are towards a new index that bet-
ter reﬂects the idea of Gately, taking into account more explicitly the variations of
“payoff” both of each party and of the remaining ones. This point poses at least two
challenges: ﬁrstly, the difference at denominator, xi−v(i), is often zero so, according
to Gately (1974) the propensity to disrupt goes to +¥ and secondly, in a weighted ma-
jority game it is frequent that v(i) is equal to 0 and v(N \{i}) is equal to 1, so, taking
into account that x(N \{i}) = 1−x(i), the propensity index is equal to −1 for all the
parties, so its utility is limited. Consequently, it is necessary to carefully evaluate how
to apply it.
A second possible research ﬁeld is to analyze the dispersion index by Gini (1914)
referred to the power as a possible representativeness index.
A third possibility is offered by an axiomatic characterization of the different in-
dices. This could help in better understanding the underlying features of each index.
Finally, the comparison of different voting systems using the governability index
requires ﬁxing a mechanism for the formation of a majority. In fact the governability
of a Parliament depends on several aspects, some of them related to the voting system,
e.g. the number of parties forming the majority, and some others independent from it,
e.g. the behavior of the members of the Parliament. In this framework, the simulative
approach could provide useful data, comparing the behavior of the various indices
using different voting systems and majority formation processes (see Carlsson et al.
1992; Eklund et al. 2008; and Rusinowska et al. 2004).
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